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Abstract
The issue of software patents is widely discussed in Europe today. The standard economic
rationale for patents is to protect potential innovators from imitation, which ultimately provides the incentive to incur the costs of innovation. This incentive topic is strongly discussed
in network effect markets such as the software market. We identified five characteristics of
software which are crucial for the question of patenting and its consequences: Sequentiality,
complementarity, the utilization and availability of open code and the necessity to ensure
interoperability as well as the digital character of the goods. Based on seven assumptions
affiliated from the literature, we developed a bipartite central probability model comparing a
deregulated market without patents to a market using the patent system. The main objectives
were to evaluate the frequency of innovations in the software market and on the other hand to
investigate monopolistic tendencies. We simulated our model under two different parameter
constellations (optimistic and pessimistic environment from a patent owner’s view). Selected
snapshots of exemplary simulations showed that strong patent protection circumvented technical progress from a macroeconomic perspective. Moreover, in the long run only one actor
(monopolist) dominated the market. Reducing the protection strength (pessimistic environment) resulted in partially contrary effects.
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1. Introduction
Software patents are a topic currently being discussed in Europe and Germany. According to
article 52 of the European Patent Agreement of 1973, computer programs are not inventions
and therefore not subject to European patent law. But in a strict sense this is only valid for
“software as such”. Accordingly, European adjudication grants patents for software. This is
more comparable to the practice found in the United States, where not only software but also
business methods are patentable. Wolfgang Tauchert from the German Patent- and Trademark-office estimated the number of granted patents involving software in 2001 to be over
500. In this context the term “computer implemented inventions” is used (DPMA 2002).
In the attempt to narrow this discrepancy between law and adjudication, the European commission conducted a pan-European questioning of the software industry. As a consequence
the European commission proposes to overtake the US approach, except the patenting of
business methods. Addressing this problem, we developed a two-stage model comparing
economic efficiency of systems with and without patents. The purpose of this paper is to answer the following two questions:
1) In which scenario (patents vs. no patents) can we expect a higher level of innovation in any given time scope? In other words: which scenario exhibits stronger incentives to innovate?
2) How do the scenarios differ in terms of the endemic propensity to monopolize?
After an overview of software patents in the economic literature (section 2) the software
market is analyzed (section 3). Based on this, in section 4 an economic simulation model incorporating local incentives associated with patents and their implications on system beha vior is developed. Section 5 shows first simulation results.

2. Literature Review
Various approaches in the economic literature analyze the correlation between patents, innovation, and social welfare. Software patents in particular are often discussed in a controversial context. We differentiate in four viewpoints:
• Software patents and the incentive problem
• Patent race and cross licensing
• Network effects and standards
• Special features of software

Software Patents and the Incentive Problem
The standard economic rationale for patents is to protect potential innovators from imitation,
thereby providing the incentive to incur the cost of innovation. The innovator receives a temporary monopolistic position (Besen & Raskind 1991). The usage of the patent system in this
point has two essential advantages:
• The patent owner (monopolist) is able to claim higher prices and larger market shares.
• The time frame for skimming the market will be extended artificially.
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In the future, the patent owner has the possibility of offering licenses and the chance to participate in the development or improvement of future innovations created by other innovators
(Ordover 1991). Because the patenting process is expensive (one application in Europe can
cost up to € 30.000 (Beckmann 2002), small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) in particular are disadvantaged. As a consequence, scarce financial and know-how resources establish substantial barriers to patenting among SMEs. An optimal company strategy could be
nondisclosure (Friedewald, Blind and Edler, 2002).
Nordhaus et al. focus on the problem resulting when technological improvements are used by
a very small group of users. From an economic perspective due to their high costs, patents are
a suboptimal solution compared to the scenario without patents (Nordhaus 1969; Gilbert &
Shapiro 1990; Kle mperer 1990).
Jaffe suggests that patents inhibit other innovation activities, e.g. in such a matter, that the
access to licenses needed for improvements will be denied. This is characterized as negative
after deductions-effect (Jaffe 1999). Kortum and Lerner furthermore point out that despite
decreasing R&D expenditure, the number of patents in the US is increasing quickly. They
substantiate these correlations with company-wide advanced innovation management (Kortum & Lerner 1997). The same perception is represented by Bessen and Maskin. Moreover
they discuss about trivial patents which conduct knowledge that is counted among the state
of the art, and therefore not patentable (Bessen & Maskin 2000).

2.1 Patent Race and Cross Licensing
As shown previously, the process of patent application is very cost intensive. Because each
patent can only be assigned once, innovators often find themselves in a patent race. Only one
can be the winner of this race. Although the losers of the race have the same R&D and patent
application costs, they attain no revenue. In this context Dasgupta and Stieglitz speak of a
socially unwanted situation and missing commensurability (Dasgupta & Stieglitz 1980). On
the other hand the licensing process offers a possibility for reducing the future innovation
costs of other innovators (Loury 1979; Ordover 1991). The winner normally is not engaged
in offering licenses. Licensing implies competition and endangers the patent owner’s monopoly position. This leads to the inhibition of R&D by other inventors with concepts for improvements on a patented product (Bessen & Maskin 2000).
If, for example, another actor has invested in developing an improvement to a product, the
firm holding the original patent may use its monopoly position to appropriate some of the
value created by the complementary innovation. This can occur even if a second firm obtains
a patent on the improvement. If the second firm can market its innovation with the consent of
the first firm, the first firm can increase its profits at the expense of the second by bargaining
to license the complementary technology at less than full value. This holdup problem reduces
R&D in complementary technologies through inventors reducing the expected return on their
investment (Chang 1995).
Although it appears as though licenses will never be assigned in such situations, it still happens. Nowadays patents possess the function of currencies. If a company needs another firms
license for its own activities, it tries to exchange its own license with that of the other license
holder. This operation is referred to as cross licensing. Patents are used as weapon in competition and play a decisive role second to negotiations (Harhoff & Reitzig 2000).
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2.2 Network Effects and Standards
The software market is determined by positive network effects deriving from the need of
product compatibility (Ceci & Kain 1982). The willingness to adopt a product innovation
correlates positively with the number of existing adopters (Weitzel, Wendt and von Westarp
1999).
Markets with network effects finally will lock-in to a monopoly situation with one standard
winning total market share. In some respects standards make further innovations and diversity difficult (Farrell & Saloner 1986). On the other hand, standards provide for compatibility
and are a prerequisite for cooperation benefits. An essential assumption for collaboration
benefits are open interfaces so that interoperability between different systems and applications can be realized. Many SMEs would have no access to large customer networks without
this interoperability. They normally are not able to establish company-standard-based networks (Blind, Edler, Nack and Straus 2001). The absence of open interfaces may lead to a
lock-in of existing customers, and therefore to monopoly network structures, because the
changing costs are to high for the current participants (Farrell 1989). Patented interfaces
boost this problem.
Stolpe claims the necessity of installing strong property rights, particulary in markets with
network effects, because they enable innovators to internalize positive externalities, and to
achieve a high market penetration without product piracy and imitation (Stolpe 2000).

2.3 Special Features of Software
Software development is basically distinguished from other products by five characteristics
which are decisive for the question of patenting and its consequences:
a) Sequentiality and Complementarity
Sequential means that each successive invention is built on the preceding one. The rate of reusing code is very high (Bessen & Maskin 2000; Besen & Raskind 1991). Complementary
means that each potential innovator takes a somehow different research line, thereby enhancing the overall probability that a particular innovation goal will be reached within a
given time scope (Bessen & Maskin 2000). The sequential and complementary nature of innovations is widely recognized, especially in high tech industries (Gort & Klepper 1992;
Green & Scotchmer 1995; Chang 1995). Analyses of many innovations found that most of
the productivity gains are achieved via improvements to the original innovation (e.g. (Enos
1962)). A variety of empirical studies found strong evidence of innovative complementarities
(Spence 1984; Jaffe 1986; Grilichs 1992). Figure 1 shows the re-use of code in the German
software industry, split in primary (IT-Service providers and manufacturers of data processing equipment) and secondary industry (manufacturing systems engineering, electrical engineering, vehicle construction, telecommunication and financial services):
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conpanies
0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

5%
6-10%

Re-use of code

11-20%
primary (n = 167)
21-30%

secundary (n = 59)

31-40%
41-50%

over 50
50%

Figure 1: Re-use of code (Blind et al. 2001)
b) Utilization and Availability of Open Code
Open code is one of the most important external factors for software development. The
strongest usage emanates from independent developers, but recently the re-use of open source
software by medium-size and large companies has increased as well (Friedewald et al. 2002).
Open Source has generic character, i.e. in many cases it is functional input which makes
software development more effective. There is no significant argument for utilizing Open
Source, but a relatively well balanced set of motives (e.g. adaptability, state-of-the-art, costs
and quality). Disclosure of code is used mostly as strategy to diffuse information about one’s
own performance.
c) Interoperability
Attributes of software that bear on the ability to interact with specified systems and with
other software products are defined as interoperability (ISO 1991). The European computer
law directive describes interoperability as the capability of a computer program to exchange
information (Fromm & Nordemann 1998). Interoperability with customer and supplier software and with competitive and complementary products can be achieved by disclosure of interfaces; the disclosure of code plays a subordinate role here. For example, patents on protocols required for interoperability are a barrier when trying to implement compatible solutions.
d) Digital Goods Character
Emery has studied the character of software, such as fast diffusion and diversification. He
found evidence that, due to the high diffusion of information technologies, software developers (innovators) compared to imitators are at a disadvantage, because copying and imitating
becomes easier. For this reason he favors software patents (Emery 1996).
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2.4 Summary of Positive and Negative Aspects
The following table summarizes positive and negative aspects of patenting software. We distinguished between the view of an individual actor (microeconomic perspective) and a macroeconomic perspective.

Positive aspects

Negative aspects

Microeconomic perspective
Discourage of imitators through the conseSubstantial costs:
quences of infringement.
costs of patent description and of patent
Patents also hamper piracy.
agents,
An extended time frame for skimming the
patent application and the costs of assignation
market is given.
of patents,
costs of the extension of a patent.
Patents enforce the first mover advantage and Patent infringement is difficult to control, estherefore the de-facto-standardization (posi- pecially in embedded systems. Moreover distive feedback loops).
covery of infringement is very expensive.
Patents represent assets strengthening the
relative competitive position.

The liability of disclosure (6 months) opens
the ideas for others and gives them the chance
to market the ideas earlier.

The liability of disclosure (6 months) opens
the ideas of others for own developments.

Development costs increase, because of licenses or bypass of patented developments.
Improvements are only possible on a complementary way (low rate of code re-using).
Risk of market exclusion.
Patents can hamper interoperability.

Expending of development costs through the
chance of being the monopolist and claiming
higher prices.
Licensing and cross licensing are possible.
Macroeconomic perspective
Patents are an important incentive for spending money in R&D.

Decrease of development efforts (holdup
problem), cannibalize the own network.
Decrease of variety of products.
Inhibition of R&D by others through the denial of licenses.

Table 1: Positive and negative aspects of patents

3. Topological structure of the German software market
In 2001 the revenue of the German market for software and IT services (primary and secondary industry) increased by about 12% to € 34 billion (EITO 2001). Altogether both indus-
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tries consist of 19.300 companies producing software (10.568 in primary branch and 8,990 in
secondary branch) (GfKM 2000).

Employees

Companies producing software (primary industry)

Companies producing software
(secondary industry)

With 1-9 employees

8 .173

4 . 058

With 10-49 employees 1 .735
With 50-199 emplo yees 475
With >199 employees 185

2 . 242
1 .326

Total

8.990

1 .364

10.568

Table 2: Structure of the German software market
The German Information and Communication Technology market (ICT market) has been
impacted heavily by the economic slowdown, even if the various markets have been affected
in a different level, stronger in the hardware segments, and fewer in software and services
(Bitkom 2002). The subsequent data refers to the primary and secondary branch.

German software market value, billion €
1999
2000
Software products
12.6
14.4

2001
15.2

2002
15.1

2003
15.1

Expansion rate

5.4%

-0.80%

-0.30%

14.2%

Table 3: German software market
The total effort for Research and Development averages € 1.359 million in the primary
branch (GfKM 2000). Therefore on average a company in the primary branch expends €
129.000 for R&D. 1

4. Software Market and Patents - Simulation Model
4.1 Assumptions
The following assumptions are based on the preceding literature review and the analysis of
the software market:
1. The software market is characterized by short innovation cycles. Improvements
emerge frequently in a cycle of less than 12 months.

1

1. 359 million €
= 129 . 000 €
10 .568 companies
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40%

50%
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7 – 12 months

13- 24 months
primary (n = 195)
secundary (n = 70)
more than 24 months

Figure 2: Innovation cycles (Blind et al. 2001)
2. The software market is characterized by a high rate of incremental progress. Innovations in this market are profoundly sequential.
3. The market is characterized by a high degree of complementarity.
4. Research and Development efforts in one generation become obsolete after a few periods.
5. The structure of the German software market is characterized by a large number of
SMEs.
6. The software market is characterized by strong network effects.
7. R&D-efforts have an extensive impact on finding future innovations.

4.2 Model Structure
Based on these assumptions, we created a bipartite economic probability model comparing a
deregulated market without patents to a market using the patent system.

Structural Parameters
The model encompasses I actors, representing software manufacturers in a special segment of
the software market (e.g. text processing). Therefore they compete against each other for the
same innovation in a period. The model considers three different company sizes. Based on
the topological data of the German software market the actors are determined as small (80%),
medium-size (15%) and large companies (5%).
The planning horizon of the model is T. Based on assumption 1 and 2, we assume, that all
actors have to decide for investment in development in every period anew and then are able
to find the innovation.
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Investment
in Development
Initial
Period
t =1

t =2

t =3

…..

t = 14

t = 15

…..

t = 19

Figure 3: Development timeline

Monetary Parameters
In each generation one or several parallel innovations lead to the economic profit v t which is
assumed to be constant over time and will be split to the successful actors (analogous to the
model of Bessen & Maskin (2000)).
I

νt = ∑ vit = ν

∀t = 1..T

i =1

Equation 1: Economic profit
Another parameter influencing the expected profit are the development costs c itd in every period. The greater the efforts the smaller the profits, but, the higher the probability of success,
as will be shown later. The amount of c itd depends on the company’s size.
If patenting is possible the companies taking part in the patenting process have to spend patent process costs c itp which include:
• costs of patent description and of patent agents,
• patent application and the costs of assignation of patents,
• costs of the extension of a patent.
The second and third item which only have to be paid by the winner, are of marginal weight.

Probability Parameters
The determination of the actor’s probability pit for finding the innovation in period t forms
the core of the presented model. pit is functionally dependent of the following parameters:
• Development costs, spent in t and in the former 3 periods: c itd , c itd −1 , c itd − 2 , c itd −3 .
• Innovation success in the preceding 3 periods, represented by the binary variables x it-1, x it-2,
x it-3 . x it is equal to one, if actor i found the innovation in period t.
• Existence of patents: if patenting without licensing is possible, incremental improvements
of others in future periods have to be found in a complementary way, what diminishes
their chances for success (assumption 3). This effect is represented by εit which decreases
the probability, if the innovation in period t was patented by an actor j≠i.
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ε < 1 if zit = 0 ∧
ε it = 
 1
else


I

∑z

jt

=1

j =1

Equation 2: Influence of existing patents
The binary variable zit reflects the successful patenting process for actor i’s innovation in
period t. Existence of patent protection in Europe persists for 20 years and therefore influences the others innovation probability for 20 periods.
The degree of impact of the included historical parameters decreases with a growing time
gap. This effect will be realized by using reverse discounting factors wd and wx (0< wd < wx <
1) for diminishing the respective historical parameters citd , citd −1 , citd− 2 , citd −3 , and x it-1, x it-2, x it-3 .
Stronger impact of later patents will be realized by exponentiating ε.
t

A:

∑

cidτ
τ =t −3

t −1

⋅ w (t −τ )

B:

d

∑

t −1

xiτ ⋅ w(xt −τ )

C:

τ = t −3

εi(ττ− t + 21)
∏
τ=t − 20

Equation 3: Factors of innovation probabilities
Terms A and B have to be normalized to values below one. Therefore the respective maximal
parameter values have to be determined by inserting the upper limits of the included parameters. cτd is the upper bound of large companies’ development costs:
t

A:

∑

cidτ
τ =t −3

t −1

⋅ w (t −τ )

∑ w(

B:

d

t −τ )
x

τ =t −3

Equation 4: Normalization of innovation probability factors
Within the probability function the normalized components are weighted again, to adjust the
relative strength of the factors´ impact. At least, the whole construct is divided by M, which
represents the overall difficulty to find innovations in the particular market.
t −1

t

∑ cidτ ⋅ wd(t −τ )

pit =

α

A
B
+β
A
B ⋅C =
M

∑x

iτ

⋅ w(xt −τ )

α ⋅ τ =tt −3
+ β ⋅ τ =t −t3−1
d
(t −τ )
∑ ciτ ⋅ wd
∑ w(xt −τ )
τ =t −3

τ =t −3

M

⋅

t −1

∏ε

τ = t − 20

(τ − t + 21)
iτ

with α , β ≥ 0; α + β = 1 and M ≥ 1

Equation 5: Innovation probability
Because the necessary values do not exist in the early periods the following conventions are
made:
citd = 0,

x it = 0,

εi τ = 1

∀t < 1
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Equation 6: Conventions for parameter values in t<1

Decision Process
The innovation and patenting process consists of four activity steps in each period.
I. Actor i has to decide whether or not to participate in the innovation process, i.e. spending development costs c itd .
II. The research process turns out to be either successful (x it=1) or unsuccessful (x it=0), according to the innovation success probability pit.
III. If x it=1, the actor has to decide about taking part in the patent race

then
→


(yit=1).

IV. Only one actor can win the patent race. The winner is determined by a random generator with equal probability for every actor, taking part in the patent race. If i is the winner, then zit=1, otherwise zit=0.
(Steps III and IV only occur, if the model is equipped with a legal patent protection system.)
A risk-neutral actor I in period t will only invest in R&D if its expected net benefit E(ν it ) is
positive. The expectation depends on the individual innovation probability, on the elevation
of effort, and on the network size. The bigger the network, the more actors will find the innovation resulting in a reduced part of the economic profit. uit represents the resulting decision.

[ ]

E ν itnet =

νt

E
 i =1
I

∑

[ ]

 1 if E ν itnet > 0
⋅ p it − citd ; u it = 

0 else
xit 


Equation 7: Decision function for investing in R&D (step I)


I



As an estimator for E  ∑ x it  the number of actors who found the innovation in the period
 i =1



before will be used:
 I

E  xit  =
 i=1 

∑

I

∑
i=1

xit −1

  I

 E  xit  = 1 if

  i =1 

∑

I

∑x
i =1

it−1


= 0



Equation 8: Decision function for investing in R&D (appendix)
The expected value does not include resulting future benefits, because the complexity of the
model increases in oversized wise, furthermore the technological progress is not predictable
in the software market.
If the actors can take advantage of an installed patent protection mechanism, the model implements an additional decision function for evaluating the benefits of patenting, including
the probability to win the patenting race. Therefore a binary variable yit is equal to one if actor i wishes to patent his innovation. Every innovator agrees to the patenting process if the
economic profit exceeds the sum of all innovations multiplied with cp .
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The future utility of patenting in present was not taken into account. This extension will be
made in future work.
vt

−cp > 0
1 if
I
y it = 
xit

i=1
 0 else

∑

Equation 9: Decision for patenting (step II)
The decision process can be described as a game theoretical problem with I players. With two
players the following situation is given:
Agent = 1
S21 =(y2 =1)

S22 =(y2 =1)

S11 =(y2 =1)

vt
v
− c p; t − c p
2
2

vt − c p ; 0

S12 =(y2 =0)

0; vt − c p

vt vt
;
2 2

Agent = 2

Table 4: Two person game
I

If v t > c p ∑ x it , s11 /s21 becomes the only Nash-equilibrium and the Pareto-optimum will not
i

occur. Therefore the actors are in a prisoner’s dilemma.
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t =1
t = t +1

t = t +1

investment in R&D

u it = 1 [yes]

u it = 0

[no]

activate innovation prozess

[found innovation]

waiting

[found no innovation]

xit = 1

xit = 0

create innovation

no creation

[patenting possible]

[patenting not possible]

Decision about patenting

[

vt
I

∑i x it

− c p + BWt pz > 0]

[

patenting

zit = 1

vt

get profit

vt
I

∑i x it

− c p + BWt pz ≤ 0]

not patenting

yit = 1
[win the race]

not patenting

yit = 0
[loose the race]

zit = 0

vt
get profit

get nothing

if t ≠ T

I

∑i xit

if t = T

Figure 4: Activity diagram
From a macroeconomic view, the main aim is to find as much as possible generations with
innovations.
T

max

∑x
t =1

t

with x t = max ( x1t ,....x It )
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Equation 10: Macroeconomic objective
The two key questions are:
1) In which scenario (patents vs. no patents) can we expect a higher level of innovation in any given time scope? In other words: Which of these scenarios exhibits
stronger incentives to innovate?
The first part of question, the number of innovations over the time, will be addressed by
equation 10. For ascertaining the second part the average of the expectation values of all participants in one period equation 7 is taken.
2) How do the two scenarios differ in terms of the endemic propensity to monopolize?
The number of innovations will be condensed into the Herfindahl-index used in industrial
economics to measure market concentration. The index is calculated by summing up the
squared market shares of each innovator. 2
 v it

HFt =
v
i =1  t
I

∑






2

Equation 11: Herfindahl-index

5. Exemplary Model Computation
5.1 Parameters Constellations
In order to obtain data about the two research questions, we computed a small instance of the
model. A distinction into two different environments was made:
1. optimistic environment with small ε,
2. pessimistic environment with ε closely to one.
Every environment was computed with 20 actors of different sizes in a ratio analogous to the
real German market structure. The simulation was run for 50 periods. The cost parameters
were equally distributed within the following ranges, while the total economic profit was
fixed to v t=100 in every period:

Actor’s size:

large

medium small

upper border

5

3

1

cid lower border

2

0.5

0

c

d
i

Table 5: Monetary parameters

2

If only one innovator finds an innovation in a period the concentration index takes the maximal value of 1, while it becomes minimal (concentration index of 1/I) if every actor finds the innovation.
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The costs for the patent process cp are negligible in such a small scenario, because even if
they are as unrealistically high as the maximal development costs of large companies and
each company would find the innovation, each of them would try to get the patent. cp comes
into account, when more realistic market sizes will be simulated.
The probability parameters are equal in the different constellations (except ε) and constant in
time. The probability parameters are:

Constant Probability Parameters
ε
wd

0.85; 0,.999

Weight of prior successful innovations
Relative weight of development costs

wx

0.9
0.5

Relative weight of successful innovations

β
M

Reducant by patent protection
Weight of prior development costs

Market difficulty

α

0.9

0.5
1.0

Table 6: Probability parameters

5.2 Results
Optimistic Environment (ε=0.85)
In all of the following diagrams the differing results of both scenarios - with and without patenting possibility - are shown.

Figure 5: Sum of innovation activities
Figure 5 shows how many actors spent development costs in the several periods. In the first
two periods all actors took efforts. In the first period nobody found an innovation, but in the
second generation four actors found it. In this case all actors took part in the patent race
which finally was won by actor 12. The impact of this patent on the innovation activities of
the remaining actors was so enormous, that in future generations nobody else spent development costs. Without patents noticeably more actors invested in development activities.
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Figure 6: Average of expectation
An interesting result is that after a few generations with increasing innovation rates the ave r

I



age expectation decreases. This happens because of the estimator for E  ∑ x it  .
 i =1



Figure 7: Found innovations
To evaluate our first question we simply counted all periods with innovations. In every snapshot under this constellation the scenario without patents had a significant higher rate of innovations.
Macroeconomic results

With patents

Without patents

Sum of periods with innovation

39

48

Table 7: Innovations with and without patents
To get an overview of the incentive situation in both “worlds” we calculated the average expectation of the actor’s decision function (equation 7) over all actors. In figure 6 it can be
seen that the average expectation was always higher in the scenario without patents.
The second main question was answered by the calculation of the Herfindahl-index. The endemic propensity to monopolize for the scenario with patents was confirmed. One actor won
the patent race in period 1, after which he was the only innovator in all periods. The missing
points represent periods in which he didn’t find the innovation. In the environment with pat-
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ent system we measured an inter-temporal Herfindahl–coefficient HFI, which represents the
distribution of the several monopolies in time on the different actors. In this case was HFI=1,
which means, that every monopoly was held by the same innovator.

Pessimistic Environment (ε=0.999)
In this environment both scenarios show almost similar results. The two peaks in periods 28
and 31 (figure 8) result from a an optimistic estimator in these periods. This is because in period 27 only one and in period 30 only three actors found an innovation (see figure 10). This
relation can also be seen in figure 9, where the average expectations are rather high in periods
28 and 31.

Figure 8: Sum of innovation activities

Figure 9: Average of expectation
Most innovations were found in period 6 with 13 resp. 12 innovations. The oscillations in this
figure result from the nature of the probability function.
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Figure 10: Found innovations
It is remarkable that if the protection strength of the patent is rather small (ε nearly 1), ma rginally more innovations will be found.

Macroeconomic results
Sum of periods with innovation

With patents
49

Without patents
48

Table 8: Innovation with and without patents
The Herfindahl-coefficient is one in every period, which means that like before, anytime the
innovators competed for a patent because of the small market size. Contrary to the optimistic
environment the inter-temporal Herfindahl-index was only 0.1112, denoting, that the patent
winner changed often over time.

Figure 11: Herfindahl-index

6. Conclusion and Further Research
In this paper the impact of software patents on innovation success of software developers was
analyzed with a bipartite model for comparing environments with and without a legal patent
system. Software development could be basically characterized by five characteristics decisive for the question of patenting and its consequences: Sequentiality, complementarity, utilization availability of open code, the necessity to ensure interoperability, as well as the digi-
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tal goods character. Based on these assumptions the model encompasses the factors influencing innovation success. We identified two key factors, taking effect upon the next three
periods, the development costs and the existence of previous innovations. In the patent scenario the patent itself will have an additional effect. From the patent owner’s perspective, we
distinguished between two different environments, namely optimistic and pessimistic. Optimistic means that the impact of patent protection is very high, i.e. that the other actors not
being the patent owner have smaller innovation probabilities in future generations (ε≤0.9). In
the pessimistic environment ε is nearly one. Selected snapshots of exemplary simulations of
small model instances showed that strong patent protection circumvented technical progress
from a macroeconomic perspective. Moreover, in the long run only one actor (monopolist)
dominated the market. Reducing the protection strength (pessimistic environment) resulted in
partially contrary effects.
In our next steps we have to test the parameterization by simulating bigger instances of the
model, integrating sensitivity analyses, and by reflecting the results against empirical observations. The actors’ development costs values could be endorsed, to get more valuable findings about the incentive level of the members of the software industry. Further incentive potentials of patents have to be evaluated and to be integrated into the model and into the game
theoretical examinations, which at least have to be augmented with a nondeterministic information base. Based on this, the model could be used as framework to make normative statements, determining the necessity of a patent system or evaluating the optimal length of patent
protection subject to the particular cost structures of the software market.
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